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"[N]either Method nor Theory alone can be taken as part of the actual work of 
the social studies. In fact, both are often just the opposite: they are 
statesmanlike withdrawals from the problems of social science. Usually, we 
have seen, they are based on some grand model of inquiry with which other 
people are beat on the head. That this grand model is not capable of 
altogether full use is not, perhaps, too important, for it may still be used 
ritualistically."  
(Mills 1970 (originally 1959): 136).  
This paper aims to present the Hamburg sociologist Gerhard Kleining's 
perspective on the methodology of qualitative social research to an English-
speaking audience. In a context where methodological discussion seems to 
have become more or less concentrated on specific fields there may be some 
value in opening up otherwise neglected issues and in presenting unfamiliar 
perspectives on familiar problems, even if that means seeming a bit naجمي. 
By exploring Kleining's central argument, that direct discovery (and not simply 
interpretation) of social reality can be made possible by a strategy of 
openness (rather than closure) in research, I want to examine some of the 
destinations that we might reach by following alternative paths (1).  
In this paper I will try to bracket as far as possible the question of whether 
Kleining is right in his arguments. This is partly a "post-methodological" move: 
I think that some of the issues raised by the question are ultimately 
unresolveable ones, at least within the social sciences. The argument 
between materialist and idealist approaches is a case in point: we can cite 
philosophers and psychologists to support our own points of view, but it is not 
clear to me that as social scientists we can resolve these issues (if in fact a 
resolution is possible). Similarly, the argument between relational conceptions 
of humanity and what has become known as "methodological individualism" 
(2) (Elster 1985: 5-8) may not be open to a genuine resolution except insofar 
as so many qualifiers are built in to the models as to render them 
indistinguishable in practice. The argument between rational and explicitly 
non-rational modes of thought is by definition not one which can be resolved 
through discussion (3). Lastly, I think it may be impossible to devise a method 
to demonstrate the validity of any statement about how human beings 
investigate the validity of statements about themselves. "Human beings", says 
Marx, "have to demonstrate the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-
worldliness of their thought, in practice" (Marx n.d.: 113), and this is as far as I 
want to take the matter of ultimate validity.  
My aim in this paper, then, will be simply to demonstrate the interest of 
Kleining's approach; I will first give an account of it in its own terms. Following 
this, I will attempt to isolate some important theoretical points about the 
approach, particularly in relation to a Marxist tradition. Lastly, I will try to 
identify some useful insights into problems of practical research which are 
offered or opened up by this approach.  
I. Social research as discovery: the methodology 
proper  
Kleining's approach derives from four main sources. The first is a particular 
German philosophical and sociological tradition associated with Marx and 
Marxism, for which dialectic modes of thought, rationalist argument and the 
criticism of appearances are central points of reference. The second is the 
sociological tradition of qualitative research, in particular the work of the 
Chicago School and of Glaser and Strauss (1967). The third appears to relate 
to Gestalt psychology, Piaget's study of cognitive development and 
psychological methods of qualitative research. The last is a rereading of the 
methodological writings of the turn-of-the century physicists: in particular, 
Kleining argues that Ernst Mach should be reclaimed from the positivists (see 
Kleining 1986: 730 for an appreciation of Mach's importance). It is also 
important to be aware of the relative isolation of qualitative research in 
contemporary German sociology; this has advantages (as well as drawbacks), 
most notably in weakening the pressures which may be exerted by dominant 
approaches to understanding and practicing qualitative methods.  
Kleining takes as his central methodological question the issue of how we, as 
human beings, find out about the (natural, social, constructed) world we live 
in. His answer, derived inter alia from Piaget's cognitive psychology, is that we 
observe and interact with the world and thus come to a better understanding 
of the organisation of reality. Hence, rather than a rigid and immobile 
dichotomy between subject and object, the two are placed in a dialectic 
relationship: the individual is discovering the world, not simply interpreting it 
from an immobile standpoint; and "the world" is itself also an active partner in 
this relationship. Kleining argues that this view of human cognitive 
development does not leave any room for a concept of scientific research 
derived elsewhere than from those methods which are open to ordinary 
individuals trying to make sense of the everyday world: "The social scientific 
methods for the knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the environment grow out of 
everyday methods ... The everyday methods are the reservoir for all social 
scientific methods. They are developed from them by exclusion, by separation 
from their everyday context, [and] by abstraction." (1982: 225). In other words, 
scientific methods represent a particular selection of everyday methods and a 
particular approach to using these methods: in Kleining's approach, the 
difference between scientific and everyday methods is precisely the 
systematic concern for openness to experience and the systematic attempt to 
understand that reality (4). Kleining thus proceeds from a descriptive 
methodology - an account of what methods of discovery are - to a normative 
one in which methods are distilled out of the everyday methods to serve a 
particular purpose - furthering the processes of openness and discovery 
rather than closure and interpretation. (5) This strategy does not rest on a 
claim that all human thought follows strategies of openness, but rather on the 
claim that processes of learning or discovery do so; effective research 
methodology is then a matter of development from the everyday strategies of 
openness rather than from those of closure, so that we are driven to discover 
more about the social world rather than to confirm our own previously-held 
views of it.  
Any discovery of the social world, then, scientific or otherwise, is a matter of 
increasingly good approximations of the structure of our own understanding to 
the structure of social reality: alternatively, we could say that any 
understanding is a better or worse approximation, a more or less partial 
perspective on reality. In other words, our concepts and theories, as well as 
our own practical experience, are the starting point in a way that they are not, 
for example, in Glaser and Strauss's (1967) "grounded theory"; we interact 
with the world and in so doing learn about it. Hence strategies for maximising 
openness are fundamental.  
The rules of qualitative research 
Kleining offers four rules for a scientific and qualitative process of approaching 
understanding to reality, which aim at maximising the effectiveness of the 
process and avoiding premature closure. Each rule relates to one of the 
elements of the more general process, which is seen as a "question and 
answer" relationship between subject (the individual) and object (external 
reality): the subject acts (observes, experiments with) the object and 
evaluates the information thus gained, but the object will itself (if it is social) 
act and observe in its turn, and may also (if it is given the chance to do so) 
offer unexpected information of various kinds, which can in turn lead to new 
questions. This is close to the concept of experience elaborated by E.P. 
Thompson in The Poverty of Theory:  
"[E]vidence does not stand compliantly like a table for interrogation: it stirs, in 
the medium of time, before our eyes. These stirrings, these events, if they are 
within 'social being' seem often to impinge upon, thrust into, break against, 
existent social consciousness. They propose new problems, and, above all, 
they continually give rise to experience - a category which, however imperfect 
it may be, is indispensable to the historian, since it comprises the mental and 
emotional response, whether of an individual or of a social group, to many 
inter-related events or to many repetitions of the same kind of event ... 
[C]hanges take place within social being, which give rise to changed 
experience: and this experience is determining, in the sense that it exerts 
pressures upon existent social consciousness, proposes new questions, and 
affords much of the material which the more elaborated intellectual exercises 
are about ... " (Thompson 1978: 7-8).  
In other words, the "dialogue between social being and social consciousness" 
goes on in social research as much as in everyday life. This dialogue has 
unmistakable overtones in terms of the power relationships between 
researcher and research subject: "a qualitative dialogue is not one of 
authoritarian criticism (autorit kritizistisch), but an egalitarian one." (Kleining 
1986: 734). It may also be worth distinguishing this experience from 
interpretation or construction of reality in the usual sense:  
"Through interpretative social research the social appears as being in 
movement. Since [this research] reconstructs meaning which is produced by 
actors and actions, it also comprises changes. These are, however, limited to 
the actors and their modes of action; they show changes in the individual, 
concrete social field, and not in the macro-social area except insofar as 
meaning can be ascribed to it. Economic dynamics, for example, cannot be 
grasped by this approach." (Kleining 1988: 247).  
The social researcher explicitly sets out to be open to experience, to change 
their understanding of their field of research towards a greater approximation 
of the reality; in other words, they engage in a "searching process" 
(Suchverfahren). As the subject acts on and evaluates social reality, they 
learn things about it because of the nature of the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched: "All areas [of this relationship] stand in a close 
relationship to each other, they determine each other and are dependent on 
each other, through action and reaction, activity and effect, generation and 
processing of information, even though the process of searching naturally 
proceeds from the subject and the object is found." (Kleining 1982: 231). The 
rules, then, are as follows:  
Rule 1. (refers to subject / researcher) 
"Prior understandings of the phenomenon to be researched should be seen 
as provisional and should be transcended with [the discovery of] new 
information with which they are not consistent." (Kleining 1982: 231)  
This rule implies that the researcher should be more open to information 
related to or generated by the object of research than to their own opinions 
about it. This is obviously easier to say than to do; means for ensuring the 
researcher's readiness to accept new information include the refusal to give 
an initial definition of the point of view from which one will view the object and 
avoiding taking up positions which are already fully articulated in the literature. 
This does not, however, imply that the researcher can be a "clean sheet"; 
rather that the traditional academic path of "reading the literature" is only 
useful to the extent that "the study of the literature takes in positions whose 
differences are as extreme as possible, hence encouraging the uncertainty of 
the researcher" (Kleining 1982: 232). A further point is the importance of 
openness in the tools of research themselves: the methods used should be 
such as to enable the discovery of unexpected information and information 
which points to the limitations of the focus of research.  
Rule 2. (refers to the object of study) 
"The object is provisional; it is only fully known after the successful completion 
of the process of discovery." (Kleining 1982: 233)  
The definition of the object of the research is itself subject to change; the 
question of the boundaries and structural unity of the phenomenon is thus 
itself one of the issues of research. The researcher's understanding, initially, 
should be as vague or as provisional as possible, to encourage an openness 
to new information leading to the recognition of structural elements of the 
object of research. The "unity" of the object can itself change in a number of 
ways during research; indeed it may change to the extent of appearing 
dissolved into a wider context. "As the structure of an object is discovered, the 
boundaries of the structure are also determined, the 'system' appears" 
(Kleining 1982: 223). The final definition of the object of research, in other 
words, is only reached at the end of the research itself.  
Rule 3. (refers to action in relation to the subject of research, hence to data 
collection) 
"The object should be approached from "all" sides; rule of the maximum 
variation of perspectives." (Kleining 1982: 234)  
The object cannot genuinely be viewed from all sides because it is not yet 
fully known; hence the important point is to gather the greatest possible 
variety of information by varying any factor in the collection and analysis of 
data which it is thought may make a difference to the ultimate result. Two 
particularly important forms of variation are those of method and of time 
(possibly also of space or culture). In other words, one should always use a 
variety of methods and always look for change over time. This variety also 
applies to the aspects of the object which are isolated for study; the qualitative 
sample in this context is either a total sample or, more commonly, an 
"extreme sample" consisting of the most radically differing aspects of the 
object of study. (Importantly, everyday experience, the ordinary, is itself 
treated as an extreme case.) "The sampling strategy is that of extreme group 
sampling on the basis of structural relevance ... [This] does not simply require 
that unusual, outlying, 'extreme' situations be studied, but also that specificity, 
what is characteristic for the object, connected to it in some way, should be 
discovered and brought into [the research]" (Kleining 1986: 734).  
Rule 4. (refers to the evaluation of information gathered, hence to data 
analysis) 
"Analysis of the data for common elements." (Kleining 1982: 237)  
The structure of the object of research is found by the discovery of common 
elements (Gemeinsamkeiten) or of structuring dichotomies. There are two 
important moves here: firstly, the research focus is shifted from an 
examination of differences within the object of research to a focus on the 
common elements which make it possible to speak of the object of research 
as forming a whole or as being a single phenomenon or process. Thus what is 
being asked here is what are the defining structural elements of the object of 
study; these are discovered at the end of the research process rather than 
defined by researcher's fiat at the start of the process. Secondly, common 
elements are understood to include opposition, contradiction and negation; 
"oppositions make particularly visible the dimensions from which they draw 
their opposition" (Kleining 1982: 239). In less philosophical language, we 
might say that dichotomies, contradictions and oppositions can themselves be 
structuring elements. I will try to show what this means in practice in a 
discussion of Kleining's method of textual analysis later. What may be worth 
pointing out here is the central importance ascribed to data analysis in this 
perspective, an issue which is often in practice treated as secondary to 
problems of data collection.  
Research methods 
This methodology is not simply compatible with a large variety of methods, but 
in fact treats the use of a number of differing approaches as a requirement for 
effective research (see 3 above). It also opens up two specific possibilities in 
terms of methods.  
The qualitative experiment 
The qualitative experiment is made possible by Kleining's analysis of scientific 
methods as derived from those of everyday life and as based on the 
interaction of the researcher with the object of research: while both everyday 
methods and quantitative ones leave place for more active and more passive 
means of interaction as a means to discovery, there is relatively little 
appreciation of the place of active methods - stressing experiment as opposed 
to observation - in qualitative research (6). The qualitative experiment is 
defined as "the intervention with relation to a (social) subject which is taken 
following scientific rules and towards the exploration (Erforschung) of its 
structure" (Kleining 1986: 724) (7). Kleining mentions three strategies within 
the experiment:  
• Maximising and minimising: this relates to the selection of 
extremes as subjects of study. Since "extremes are of course 
extremes 'of something', [they are] structurally characterised 
relationships" (Kleining 1986: 735), the opposite poles of these 
relationships are structurally relevant. For example, one could 
attempt to find out how the researcher can have a maximum of 
effect on the context being studied with a minimum of effort - and 
in what contexts a maximum of effort will bring a minimum of 
effect. Either a single relationship or a number of relationships can 
be "extremised" at a time, depending on the level of knowledge and 
hence on the competence of the researcher.  
• Testing limits: "Qualitative methods aim at determining the limits 
of the object, the areas in which structure becomes arbitrariness, 
figure becomes background, what is meant becomes what is not 
meant, influence becomes lack of effect, meaning becomes 
nonsense." (Kleining 1986: 735). Experimentation here involves 
changes that make boundaries visible or bring about ambiguity. 
Paradoxes are a special case of this: "borderline cases where 
contradictions present themselves so that their contradictory 
nature becomes visible" (Kleining 1986: 736).  
• Adaptation: This involves developing a multiplicity of techniques 
which are relevant to the subject of study, keeping these 
techniques flexible, and (in Kleining's archaeological metaphor) 
protecting the structure which is being studied.  
Natural experiments 
Beyond these forms of experimentation, Kleining also mentions two forms of 
"natural experiments": the thought experiment and the ex-post-facto 
experiment.  
In relation to the thought experiment, Kleining mentions its use by Mach, 
Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg and Weizs er. He argues that the same 
problems of disentangling interpretation and reality hold in thought as in our 
experience of the world: "[mental objects] (gedachte Gegenst e) are also the 
transformed (verarbeitete) external world: representation, lived, experienced, 
known reality." (1986: 742) Reflection involves both observation of and 
changes in our thinking. The same rules of openness, provisionality, variation 
of perspectives and analysis for common elements hold. The thought 
experiment could then perhaps form one potential part of a research process, 
one way of approaching our articulated understanding to our actual 
experience of the subject of research.  
The ex-post-facto experiment consists in examining a process which has 
already finished as if it had been planned in advance: this is of course made 
possible by the absence of the need to "hold all other factors constant" and so 
on. Kleining points out that ex-post-facto methods are natural in that they are 
"quite normal contemplations and absolutely necessary for the understanding 
of everyday processes: what happened, how and why?" There are obvious 
links here with historical approaches: "ex-post-facto experiments thematise 
specifically historical change" (Kleining 1986: 744).  
In both cases, in other words, one is taking what are very often "everyday 
methods" used by social scientists when thinking about things: imagining how 
they could change or what the results of particular changes would be, and 
examining once-off processes for information; but in a number of contexts 
they are still used unproblematically in their everyday form. Part at least of 
what Kleining is saying here is that we can take reflections which in any case 
are part of our thinking as social researchers and make them more explicit, 
practice them in more rigorous, more "scientific" ways, and so on - rather than 
leaving them at the level of "common-sense" and taken-for-granted ways of 
thinking.  
Documentary analysis 
I will now attempt to show something of the implications both of the general 
methodology and of this experimental approach in the context of documentary 
analysis.  
The issue of data analysis as opposed to data collection appears to be 
somewhat under-theorised in the literature. Kleining offers a model of analysis 
which is both qualitative, discovery-oriented and systematic. In particular, this 
general method is offered in a specialised form as a method of documentary 
analysis. I will mention the main points of the procedure for documentary 
analysis; the more general approach to data analysis is an extended and 
abstracted version of the same approach (see 4 above).  
There are two stages in the process: in the first stage, either all the 
information gathered, or an "extreme sample", is analysed for characteristic 
elements and grouped on the basis of similarity or of difference. Importantly, 
this grouping is not on the basis of a priori categories, but in terms of 
responses to "questions" which are asked of the documents and 
"experiments" which are performed on the documents. The kinds of questions 
and experiments which are used should be as varied as possible but also as 
open as possible to unexpected information. What follows are examples taken 
from Kleining's analyses of Helmut Kohl's New Year speeches and of a chain 
letter (Kleining 1990a, 1990c).  
Some examples of appropriate questions and possible answers to the text 
are:  
(Kohl speeches):  
In what kinds of contexts does the speaker use "I" and where does he 
use "we"?  
"I" is used in contexts which stress the similarity with the 
listeners - "The speaker is one of all of us" (1990a: 5) -, "we" is 
used to underline this unity; whenever possible "I" is transformed 
into "we" (8).  
(Chain letter):  
What kinds of things am I expected to do?  
Do like the others (like yourself) who have sent on the chain letter; 
wait for happiness to arrive.  
What is said about the "chain"?  
I am part of a happy community spanning the globe, linked by 
irrationality and religion.  
Some examples of appropriate experiments with the document are:  
(Kohl speeches):  
What happens if I reduce the text to its logical semantic content?  
It shrinks to about a third of its original size without any loss of 
substance; the redundancies in the original text become visible, as 
does its more trivial character.  
(Chain letter):  
What happens if I substitute different numbers?  
Translating hours into days gives a vaguer and less urgent deadline 
(4 days vs. 96 hours).  
Substituting the values gives an appearance of rational causality 
(20 copies = 20 million marks instead of 20 copies = 9 million 
marks).  
(General):  
What happens if I change the order of different parts; what makes most 
difference, what makes least difference?  
What happens if I change all the actors, if I change the linguistic 
register, if I change the form?  
This process is repeated along different dimensions, following different 
lines of questioning, until no new elements are being discovered. In the 
second stage, the groups are themselves grouped on the basis of their 
own common elements or shared oppositions; this may require a 
transformation of the original groups and hence a return to the first 
stage. If it is likely to affect the result, this analysis should be 
performed by more than one researcher or participant. At the endpoint, 
"we have discovered the common elements in the multiplicity of forms of 
appearance and the fragments of data. In this way we have discovered 
the sought-after structure of the object." The operative rule is that all 
the data must be shown to be structurally related; this can also be 
expressed as the rule that no data may contradict the analysis (9). An 
important feature of this approach is the ever-present possibility of 
having to return to the starting-point if the analysis is flawed, rather 
than writing off anomalous information as irrelevant. In relation to the 
general problems of data analysis, the possibility of generalising this 
method to any type of data is important; it means that we can avoid the 
often-present pressure to inflate the significance of printed documents 
and the representativity of more articulated or intellectual documents, as 
well as the pressure towards "texts" of particular kinds and the sorts of 
assumptions that often accompany this as opposed to documents of other 
kinds. Kleining comments:  
"Today we have to stress that both whole texts, content and form, as well as 
all kinds of texts are subjects of social scientific research, because they are 
created and used socially, in other words [they] are social products: everyday 
texts, diaries, everyday stories, documents of every kind, scientific texts, trivial 
literature and also literary works of art ..." (1986: 740)  
II Theoretical affinities and implications 
I have attempted to show something of the importance of discovery and 
dialectics as categories within Kleining's work; before discussing the practical 
results of the methodology, I want to examine the intermediate categories of 
structure and experience, which are, I think, fundamental points of juncture in 
this kind of thought as well as central to everyday research. In this section I 
will use E.P. Thompson's (1978) discussion of these issues to illuminate some 
of the points in Kleining's argument.  
The concept of structure 
I have already said that there may be issues in methodology which are not 
capable of resolution within social science. This applies in particular to the 
concept of the social reality which is the object of research (for example, as 
between relational and individualist approaches); hence my aim in discussing 
structure here is simply to discuss how, if we were looking for it, we might set 
about finding it.  
The concept of structure in Kleining is an explicitly relational, but not a 
structuralist, one: a significant point of difference is the emphasis placed on 
change over time, on process (and, presumably, causality) as forms of 
structural relations. The focus, then, is on the relations between elements 
rather than on the elements themselves; this is because the elements are not 
approached as isolated units, but in their quality of elements of relationships. I 
have already indicated how Kleining approaches structure within the research 
process - that is, as dimensions of which the aspects studied are extremes, 
and as common elements or dichotomies which are discovered by the 
process of analysis. A potential problem is the argument that this structure is 
an artefact of the researcher's own making; Kleining's argument for discovery, 
however, needs to be able to find structure "out there". Here I think Thompson 
may be of help: firstly, because of the important point that we tend to find 
ourselves dealing with grouped and multiple information unless we 
deliberately set up methodologies to cut up social reality into what appear to 
us to be individual parts (is a magazine an individual item, or do we need to 
isolate individual articles?), and in this case we find relationships, groupings 
and common elements already present in that given multiplicity - it is not a 
case of building bridges between islands so much as looking at the whole 
archipelago (see, for example, Thompson 1978: 7). Thompson also has this 
to say about the ways in which historical evidence may be interrogated, 
including:  
"As links in a linear series of occurrences, or contingent events ... such a 
reconstruction ... being an essential constituent of the historical discipline, a 
pre-requisite and premise of all historical knowledge, the ground of any 
objective (as distinct from theoretic) notion of causation, and the 
indispensable preliminary to the construction of an analytic or structured 
account (which identifies structural and causative relations)";  
"As links in a lateral series of social /ideological / economic / political relations 
... ";  
"It may follow from this, if we press the point a little further, that even discrete 
facts may be interrogated for 'structure-bearing' evidence ... A historical 
materialist may argue that the structural organisation of given societies may 
be inferred not only from larger evidences ... but may be inferred, in some 
part, from certain kinds of seemingly discrete facts themselves. Thus a tenure 
exists as 'fact' as some Latin formula inscribed upon a court roll; but what that 
tenure 'meant' cannot be understood independently of an entire structure of 
tenurial occupancy and attendant law: that is, within a tenurial system: hence 
this 'fact' ... carries within it some 'index' towards that system, or, at least, it 
should propose to the interrogator an indicative question." Equally, a "soldier" 
(apparently an individual) cannot be a soldier without an army (Thompson 
1978: 29-30).  
The category of experience  
So we may not be entirely stuck in relation to the problem of discovering 
structure and relationship; this still leaves us with the question of how we 
understand the ontological status of the information we gather in our research, 
and the category of experience is central here. If we are to accept that the 
world as we experience it is at least partially constructed by ourselves (our 
perception of the unity of phenomena and of relationships such as time, space 
or causality cannot be derived simply from our partial and discontinuous 
sense impressions of reality (Kleining 1991: 5-6; see also Pirsig 1989: 133-
138), but nevertheless argue for discovery rather than simply interpretation, 
we have to indicate in what ways the world is not constructed by ourselves - in 
other words, the points at which social reality can make itself felt, if necessary 
against our constructions (10). Otherwise we run the risk of collapsing entirely 
into solipsism. One obvious move is to identify ourselves as social beings and 
our own constructive activity as itself socially determined. This is important, 
but it may not be enough; it runs the risk of ultimately being a strategy of 
closure. If it were possible to indicate ways in which the external world could 
make its presence felt against our constructive activity, we might be able to 
argue for the possibility of something more (11).  
I think Thompson does provide such an indication, in terms of experience, or 
the determination of interpretation by reality. In this perspective a scientific 
methodology would be characterised inter alia by not being an arbitrary, 
"anything goes" approach. The material (social reality, and not simply the 
world of meanings) should determine (set limits to and exert pressures on) the 
constructions which can be placed on that reality more closely than in 
everyday methods (Kleining's method, of course, aims at making this 
determination an absolute one):  
"To be an object, to be 'null or inert', does not remove that object from being a 
determining party within a subject - object relation. No piece of timber has 
ever been known to make itself into a table: no joiner has ever been known to 
make a table out of air, or sawdust. The joiner appropriates that timber, and, 
in working it up into a table, he is governed both by his skill (theoretical 
practice, itself arising from a history, or 'experience', of making tables, as well 
as a history of the evolution of appropriate tools and by the qualities (size, 
grain, seasoning, etc.) of the timber itself. The wood imposes its properties 
and its 'logic' upon the joiner as the joiner imposes his tools, skills and his 
ideal conception of tables upon the wood ... [T]he object remains, within limits, 
determinant: the wood cannot determine what is made, nor whether it is made 
well or badly, but it can certainly determine what can not be made, the limits 
(size, strength, etc.) of what is made, and the skills and tools appropriate to 
the making. In such an equation 'thought' (if it is 'true') can only represent 
what is appropriate to the determined properties of its real object, and must 
operate within this determined field." (Thompson 1978: 209-210)  
And, we might add in a slightly different language, the more detailed 
information we have to work with, the less scope we have for handling that 
information just as we please: the determination, in other words, can be 
stronger or weaker depending on how systematic our information is and how 
systematically we handle it. A rejection of pure empiricism, in other words, 
does not imply that we have to reject any possibility that particular 
understandings of reality may not be closer or further away from the reality 
itself. This relationship between effective understanding of reality and the 
reality itself is of course fundamental to everyday survival in the social (and 
natural) world.  
If this initial move is made, Kleining's claim for the possibility of discovery 
starts to seem less strange, and we can proceed to questions such as that of 
how we can maximise the openness of the individual and their willingness to 
change their understanding. Rather than assuming a rigid dichotomy between 
subject and object or a world in which there is nothing outside the subject and 
their interpretations, in other words, this allows a move towards overcoming 
the division between subject and object. When the subject has brought their 
structure of understanding to correspond to the structure of the social world, 
this is not simply a matter of coming closer to the structure of other people's 
understandings (we could ask ourselves whether it always happens that 
people understand their own lives, for example). It also represents some 
scope for what might be an important notion: the concept that the researcher 
might themselves learn something and change during the course of their 
research. One is not then either attempting to dissolve the object in the 
subject or to assert the primacy of subject over object. Rather, the subject is 
seen as capable of change because of their relational (social) and historical 
nature; scientific methodology becomes the attempt to find ways of allowing 
the social relations entered into in research to determine the researcher's 
understanding of the object.  
III Perspectives on practical research 
I said at the outset that I was more interested in seeing where Kleining's 
perspective took us than in arguing for its ultimate validity; in this final section 
I want to indicate some points at which I found resolutions of some of the 
problems in my own research on counter cultures.  
Systematic research 
The first relates to the selection of objects of study, types of information and 
methods of data collection. For researching the kinds of complex, 
contradictory and often extremely disparate social contexts I am interested in, 
the possibility that a systematic approach can simultaneously be a highly 
selective one is obviously enormously useful, as a method of getting past 
mental blocks, as well as being a means to generate an intentional and 
workable research procedure.  
Kleining's methodology is, however, still quite a demanding one. Some 
aspects of this are perhaps easy enough to come to terms with: the 
requirements of variation of methods and of variation over time are, I think, 
defensible requirements, even if they might exceed the limits of postgraduate 
research projects in some contexts (12). Others are less straightforward; to 
the extent that a number of analysts are required for example, this would 
seem to conflict quite straightforwardly with the usual requirements for 
dissertations, as would the attempt to avoid starting from positions which are 
already firmly established within "the literature". Presumably the question of 
manageability in relation to the size of the topic would come into play at some 
point as well; the basic requirement is that of the "maximum variation of 
perspectives", in other words of covering all the extremes of structurally 
relevant difference. Kleining suggests that in some contexts the research 
needed could be reduced to 60-80 interviews covering 20-25 (open-ended) 
questions (Kleining 1982: 236), but this, and the necessary analysis, would 
not be a short exercise in itself. The question could be asked as to how far in 
terms of (structural, numerical, chronological, spatial) scale the method could 
be taken before it became unworkable. This might not be as great a 
stumbling-block as it seems; the method lends itself to the independent 
generation of analyses of relatively limited areas (and the collection of 
corresponding data) which can then be legitimately subjected to a "second-
generation" analysis which would integrate them (including, if necessary, the 
re-analysis of the material gathered for the "first-generation" analyses).  
Alternatively, one might make a partial retreat on Kleining's aims of definitive 
discovery as the goal of every piece of research: this would involve focussing 
on the processual nature of the research process and the significance played 
by the researcher's initial understanding of the subject of research. It might be 
possible to argue, in other words, that a less systematic and less final version 
of Kleining's methodology could leave us with a result which, although still 
representing a partial perspective on the subject and perhaps misinterpreting 
central structural relations, would nevertheless represent a building block for 
further work. This would entail making all the material used in the analysis 
available to other researchers, because of the requirement to return to the 
stage of initial (re-)grouping under certain conditions. Such an approach might 
enable a more collective and longer-term approach to the research of a 
particular topic, still aiming at a definitive analysis, but applying Kleining's 
perspective to the results of a number of individual, albeit related, research 
projects.  
Whether or not this is possible, the humanisation of the research process that 
is implicit in Kleining's emphasis on the everyday and on totality has its 
attractions, and the method does offer some pointers in this direction, in a 
number of contexts: in terms of how we bring ourselves into the research 
process, in terms of how we work, and in terms of how we involve the 
"research subjects" in the research.  
On the first point, Kleining's location of the researcher's initial understanding 
as a starting point is important in allowing us to see not just our own academic 
reading and research experience of the subject as relevant, but more 
generally the totality of our experience, whether it is direct (personal) or 
indirect (through books, for example), and whatever kind of context it appears 
in: the researcher as person would then appear fully within the process rather 
than being denied, but without being encouraged to dominate it.  
The idea of working in small teams of researchers using qualitative methods 
in particular seems an appealing one; if we are to adapt our structures of 
understanding to the structures of extremely complex social realities (rather 
than attempt to impose our understanding on these structures) as well as 
interact with the people who inhabit these realities, in all their differences, 
particularities and conflicts, this will impose strains on researchers which the 
group context could go at least some way towards making bearable. On a 
related point, Kleining comments that the notion of the "maximum variation of 
perspectives" offers a rare theoretical legitimation for the traditionally 
attractive idea of using a multiplicity of methods.  
That the "subjects" of research should be enabled to participate more fully in 
determining the research process is not of course a new idea. Kleining's 
ideas, however, open up three specific possibilities in this area. The first, 
based on the rule of the maximum variation of perspectives, is the possibility 
of offering the participants a place within the scientific research process itself 
which does not depend either on circumscribing their freedom of action or on 
extensive training. The variation of the individuals collecting and analysing the 
data is a necessary requirement of Kleining's methodology and not something 
imported from outside, and the kind of activity which is involved is not one 
which requires "discipline" in a particular form of action so much as a question 
of bringing an open-minded attitude to looking for extreme difference and 
analysing it for common elements. Secondly, the politics of the research move 
onto a rather different plane: one is not now arguing about the imposition or 
acceptance of rigid views of the world, but rather talking about people learning 
(in the case of the researcher) or thinking (in the case of the participants) 
about a shared reality. Incidentally, I think we are likely to find that by asking 
people to think about their own lives in different ways we are less likely to 
bore them; this is certainly the case within my own field of study, that of 
counter cultural consciousness. Thirdly, given that not all of those we interact 
with in our research will be interested or able to join in as full researchers, this 
methodology offers natural points for returning to them - at the point in 
particular of the first and second stages of the process of grouping and 
analysis, where stock is taken of the extent to which the statements made 
conflict with or describe the information collected. The value at these points of 
involving "local experts" should be fairly evident: if somebody can say to us 
"That leaves out X", this is a very strong piece of information coming out of 
the heart of social reality which we would want to take into account. 
Incidentally, if the need to involve the research subjects as active and 
autonomous participants is built into the research process in this way, it opens 
a scope for a greater determination of the focus of social research by the 
participants than is present otherwise: at its simplest, we will need to interest 
those we want to involve, and that means finding topics that are relevant to 
them.  
The researcher as active participant 
Lastly, I want to raise three related issues, which may bring the discussion 
back towards the other papers in this collection. The first is that of the active 
role of the researcher. In research on areas such as counter cultures this is a 
continuous problem, and one which I think is not adequately dealt with by the 
traditional approach, which focuses on participant observation where the 
participation is only for research purposes. In the kind of research I am 
interested in the researcher is often an active participant prior to being a 
researcher; in other words, they already have a position within the power 
structures of the context they are researching, and they are then likely to have 
a prior history of conflict as well as of cooperation with other members of the 
group. The knowledge gained in their research can also be a source of power 
within the group, independently of the power relationships within the research 
process proper. This is particularly true where the kinds of resources which 
are available to the researcher (spare cash, a work telephone, access to 
printing and photocopying, contacts, social status, access to particular kinds 
of legitimations and skills) are not available to those being researched. 
Furthermore, such groups are very often small enough and flexible enough for 
the interviewer, even if the above did not hold, to exert a significant influence 
on the direction of the group. In research on "new social movements", the 
case has been made for the researcher to take on an explicitly organising 
role: in Touraine the researcher brings the group to an understanding of its 
own true consciousness (see Touraine (1981) for a full discussion of what is 
of course a much more complex viewpoint) and in Melucci extremely 
contrived situations are organised by the researcher and, presumably, their 
team of assistants. (See the discussion in Melucci (1989: 235-261).) Neither 
this nor an entirely passive role for the researcher seems entirely credible nor 
entirely desirable.  
What Kleining's work and in particular the discussion of the qualitative 
experiment opens up as a possibility is that we could see the researcher's 
activity within the group - of whatever kind - as a means of information-
gathering, one form of "asking questions of social reality". The response, both 
of individuals and of the social context (obviously these are two very different 
types of responses) can then be treated as itself a form of data. This is 
another form of involving the whole person within the research process, and 
(since this happens anyway) there is no harm in making it explicit. There is 
then, however, a potential conflict between the motivations of the researcher-
as-participant and those of the participant-as-researcher. There is a real risk 
that we fall into the trap of thinking that we can most effectively demonstrate 
"the reality and power, the this-worldliness of one's thought", to quote Marx 
(n.d.: 113) by dominating the group itself. This kind of move is all too easy to 
make, involving as it does a linkage between two versions of what Raymond 
Williams describes as "a basic orientation to the world as available raw 
material ... [which] necessarily includes an attitude to people as raw material" 
(1985: 261) - a linkage between a version of this which relates to our personal 
lives and a version of this which relates to our research activity. Rather than 
attempting to understand the world in order to change it in a given direction, in 
other words, we would be changing it in an arbitrary direction to demonstrate 
that we understood it. Avoiding this, I think, means tackling the question of the 
research ethic head-on, and this is my second point.  
Ethical issues 
Ethical solutions which depend on exogenous ethics appear as both 
intellectually and practically unsatisfying (see Kleining (1988: 236-239) and 
Thompson (1993) for alternative statements of the problem). Such solutions 
appear to suggest in practice (in other words, if we were to take them 
seriously enough to attempt to institutionalise them) either that all researchers 
should be nice people or that it would be possible to formulate rules which 
were strict enough to be enforced by some professional body and yet which 
covered all the relevant cases; either seems to me unlikely. It would be far 
better to identify a way in which ethical imperatives could be discovered within 
relevant cognitive approaches.  
Kleining's perspective opens up the possibility that one could formulate an 
ethical approach which identified the researcher's openness to the experience 
of research and the experience of the participants as defining characteristics 
of good research. As one case of this, Kleining argues that in qualitative 
experiments, the most active form of qualitative research, "the explorative 
aims [of qualitative experiments] should prevent the destruction [of the subject 
of research].... Their methodology involves their careful use: the adaptation of 
methods to the object, the testing of boundaries, the gradual maximisation or 
minimisation of aspects in the object of research, the general question-answer 
game in the principle of dialogue, if possible with the direct participation of 
those affected (der Betroffenen) ... " (Kleining 1986: 744-5).  
If it becomes possible to argue that this kind of attitude is a precondition of 
good research, I think we might see a lot more ethically acceptable research. 
This would lead us in a sense away from the dominant exogenous moralities 
of our societies to an endogenous morality which we can find in some counter 
cultural thought as well as in some very ordinary modes of thought: the idea, 
most explicit in Buddhism, that one should abstain from particular kinds of 
behaviour because of the effect they have on our own consciousness.  
Relationships of understandings 
The last issue I want to raise also deals with the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched, in this case in terms of the status we ascribe 
to the (self-)understandings of the participants. The understandings of reality 
and the self-understandings to be found within the kind of contexts I am 
researching are highly contradictory ones: this excludes a simple acceptance 
of the participants' points of view as an option. If one can understand 
differences of particular kinds as relating tostructuring dichotomies, we may 
be able to make a certain number of steps forward. An example of the kind of 
point at issue is the question of power relationships. We can reasonably 
expect that in relationships of domination - within political organisations, for 
example - it is unlikely that all participants will have the same story to tell 
about decision-making (13); in other words, we can not simply produce an 
analysis on the basis of taking the accounts of the participants as 
straightforwardly true, among other things because of their contradiction. Thus 
for one group, the problem may be the centralisation of power in the hands of 
a small 鬩te; for another group, the problem may be the way in which the 
making of necessary decisions is frustrated by an unworkable structure and 
an unrealistic internal opposition. Given sufficient evidence, a researcher 
could be justified in identifying common elements such as the identification of 
opposing groups, the existence of conflict over the ways in which decisions 
are taken, and the perception of a relationship between structures of decision-
making and the location of effective power. The analysis is a result of 
comparing the self-understandings of the participants (how they locate 
themselves within a given social context), but at the same time it is not 
identical with these self-understandings.  
In this perspective, the researcher on counter cultures is reproducing the 
processes of observation and experiment, as well as the attitude of openness 
and provisional understanding, which are characteristic of much of the counter 
culture, which is notably undogmatic and evidences a high level of practical 
consciousness. The ideas and the perception of the movement itself can be 
taken seriously, in other words, without being set up as canonical truth. In 
some ways it would be odd for the researcher to be the only individual in this 
"semi-shared reality" not to be attempting to make sense of it for themselves - 
to be the only member of the group who did not have their own idiosyncratic 
ideas about what was going on. This obviously does not resolve the question 
of power in research results, but (as I have argued) the ultimate source of 
resistance to power in this context is the cognitive requirement of the 
openness of the researcher. A researcher who imposed their own 
interpretations on the movement would simply be a bad researcher; but the 
opposite to this is not the acceptance of the movement's (contradictory) self-
image - it is the attempt to understand the movement and to change one's 
own understanding of it.  
Conclusion: research as supportive and critical 
Can this still be supportive research? I think it can. It is true that the method, 
when directed towards the dominant institutions, is very clearly a critical one; 
appearances are criticised in terms of the underlying structure, which thus 
presents the individual phenomena to us in a new light. As with the ethical 
approach, this is an immanent concept of criticism: the real is ultimately 
criticised in terms of the real and not on externally-derived terms. This 
concept of criticism, which we find in Marx, is one of global social rationality; 
but it can also be brought to groups with which we are in greater sympathy. 
Conflict and criticism are, after all, not foreign to everyday life, let alone to 
counter cultural groups, for example. What Kleining says of qualitative 
experiments can perhaps be generalised:  
"[Qualitative experiments] have a kind of immanent morality, if by this we can 
understand the legitimacy of the illumination (Aufkl ng) of structures and 
conditions of social relations. The reason for this is of course to be found in 
their relatively limited reification [of others] and in their compatibility with 
everyday situations" (Kleining 1986: 745).  
In other words, we can act as human beings, as participants and as 
researchers without needing to be false to our relations with others, without 
destroying the context we are researching, and without denying the value of 
sociology: rather than simply reworking the self-images of the group and 
confirming its world-pictures we can offer a clearer self-understanding and a 
clearer understanding of the wider society - which are necessary, if not 
sufficient, conditions of conscious change.  
 
Footnotes 
(Note 1) I wish to thank Hilary Tovey (Dept. of Sociology, TCD) for her 
comments on an earlier version of this paper and Brian Torode, Anne Good 
and Carol MacKeogh for their careful editing. I also wish to record my 
indebtedness to Prof. Kleining for the opportunity to participate in his 
courses and his discussion group on qualitative methodology during my 
research in Hamburg in 1990-91 and for his advice on and encouragement 
of that research. [Back]  
(Note 2) I find Raymond Williams' discussion (Williams 1976: 133-136) of the 
history of the concept of the individual illuminating in this respect. [Back]  
(Note 3) However, it is an important fact that in practice most writers and 
thinkers, whatever their stated position, present what is recognisably a 
rational argument of some form, in the sense of attempting to convince others 
by the communication of an (implicitly or explicitly) systematic or structured 
argument; irrational perspectives are much more frequent than genuinely 
irrational modes of presentation. [Back]  
(Note 4) Obviously "scientific" is used normatively rather than descriptively 
here: not all methods used by people describing themselves as scientists are 
necessarily scientific ones, in this usage. [Back]  
(Note 5) These everyday methods include experimentation, observation and 
questioning as well as simpler techniques such as spontaneous activity and 
comparison. In this perspective, qualitative and quantitative methods are not 
located in different directions; rather they represent different degrees of 
abstraction from everyday methods. Specifically, quantitative methods deal 
with the measurement of concepts which they cannot themselves generate: "If 
[qualitative research] explains a subject, a quantification of this does not help; 
if it does not explain it, quantitative research cannot make good the mistake." 
(Kleining 1982: 228) At a later point (Kleining 1990c: I.8, I.9) Kleining placed 
hermeneutic (interpretative) approaches at a higher level of abstraction than 
discovery-oriented approaches. [Back]  
(Note 6) Kleining's discussion of the history of qualitative experimentation 
draws mainly on the work of natural scientists and psychologists. He sees the 
qualitative experiment as largely absent from the social sciences, with the 
partial exception of ethnomethodology. On Garfinkel's experiments he 
comments: "They were, however, not used for the purposes of discovery, but 
for the demonstration of previously known states of affairs (Sachverhalte)." He 
sees this as less advanced from the point of view of a discovery-oriented 
methodology than contemporary natural scientific and psychological 
approaches (Kleining 1986: 728-733). [Back]  
(Note 7) Note that in contrast to the quantitative experiment, the qualitative 
experiment aims at discovering which relationships are relevant, rather than 
testing pre-given variables (Kleining 1986: 725). [Back]  
(Note 8) These are my own summaries of Kleining's more detailed and 
analytic results. [Back]  
(Note 9) This "100% rule" is "holistic" in the sense that it is based on the 
position that nothing definitive can be said about isolated areas of the data 
until one has reached a definitive analysis of all the data. Nevertheless, this 
does not prevent provisional statements about the data (since the bulk of the 
analysis in fact consists of generating such statements); and it is important to 
note that this 100% rule applies to a highly selective collection of information. 
[Back]  
(Note 10) I think there are weaknesses in the apparent identification of all 
social reality with explicit meaning alone. There is also, for example, physical 
existence; there are also subconscious psychological events. Polemically, 
these issues could be identified as the most straightforward contributions of 
Marx and Freud to modern thought. "A brave man once convinced himself 
that people only drowned in water because they were obsessed with the 
thought of gravity. If they struck these ideas out of their heads, for example by 
declaring them to be superstitious and religious notions, they would be safe 
from any danger in water." (Marx n.d.: 118) [Back]  
(Note 11) Bryan Turner argues that "it appears to be logically important to 
distinguish between three separate issues: (1) are beliefs socially 
determined? (2) are beliefs true or false? and (3) are beliefs rationally held?" 
(1991: xxxix). What I want to argue is that it may be possible to identify kinds 
of social relation (research situations) where we can say that the social 
determination of our beliefs about that situation is of such a kind as to lead us 
to hold true beliefs; in such a case our beliefs would be indeed rationally held. 
[Back]  
(Note 12) This may be an overstatement of the case: Kleining himself offers 
an analysis of three New Year speeches by Chancellor Kohl (Kleining 1990a) 
and restricts himself to the analysis of these texts alone; the variation of 
method is limited to variant methods of textual analysis (observation and 
experiment) and the variation over time to three years. However, the claim is 
not made that the analysis has any wider significance than the analysis of 
three speeches; the divergence would arise at the point where the results of 
the analysis were said to tell us something about the fundamental nature of 
the West German state, for example. Such a claim could only be made if we 
were to make such an analysis of a group of types and sources of evidence 
which between them offered a "maximum variation of perspectives" on that 
state. [Back]  
(Note 13) This is particularly true if we take a complex notion of power such 
as that offered by Steven Lukes, which accepts that "the domination of 
defenders of the status quo may be so secure and pervasive that they are 
unaware of any potential challengers to their position and thus of any 
alternative to the existing political process, whose bias they work to maintain"; 
on the other hand, if we are to include, as Lukes does, manipulation and 
authority as cases where conflicts of interest may be latent (not politically 
articulated), in our conception of power, we will have to find ways of 
discovering relations which are not explicitly visible to the dominated groups 
(Lukes 1974: 21, 32). [Back]  
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